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ABSTRACT
Different approaches to quantifying the degree of capital mobility
for a cross—section of currencies ——particularlysaving—investment corre-
lations and tests of real interest parity —haveappeared to show a
surprisingly low degree of financial market integration. We use a new data
set, forward rate data for 24 countries, including many small industrial-
ized countries and seven LDCs, to decompose the real Interest differential
into two parts: the covered interest differential, or political premium,
and the real forward discount, or currency premium. The latter In turn can
be decomposed into the exchange risk premium and expected real
depreciation.
We find a high degree of capital mobility across political boun-
daries for most of the G—11 countries, plus Hong Kong and Singapore, for
our sample period of 1982 to 1987. Even for most of the other LDCs and
smaller industrialized countries, for which covered interest parity clearly
fails, the political premium is not as big a component of the real Interest
differential as the currency premium. France would appear to have higher
capital mobility than most by the criterion of real interest differentials,
but is seen in fact to have low capital mobility by the criterion of
covered interest differentials, a clear example of the superiority of the
latter criterion.
Jeffrey A. Frankel Alan T. MacArthur
Department of Economics Department of Economics
University of California University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720 Berkeley, CA 94720
(415) 642—80841 • Thethallenge tothe View of (hpital as Highly ?bile
Internationalcapital mobility, at least among most major industri-
alized countries, is conventionally thought to have reached a very high
level by the 1980s. Potentially infinite capital flows are thought to
eliminate differentials among countries' expected rates of return.
The empirical validity of the conventional view has recently been
challenged from several different directions. First, Feldstein and Horioka
(1980) and Feldstein (1983) reasoned that if capital were indeed perfectly
mobile, then a fall in private saving or in the government budget surplus
in one country should not lead to crowding out of investment; the country
should rather be able to borrow enough funds from abroad at the going world
interest rate to make up the difference. Wit investment rates in fact are
highly correlated with national saving rates, from which Feldstein and
Horioka conclude that capital mobility is not high after all. Numerous
studies have responded to Feldstein and Horioka, most of them econometric
critiques. Wit even when econometric problems, particularly the
endogeneity of national saving, are addressed, the Feldsteln—Horioka
empirical findings seem to hold up.
The second assault on the conventional wisdom of high capital
mobility comes from tests of real interest parity. Real interest rates
would have to be equalized across countries for exogenous changes in saving
not to crowd out investment, since it is presumably the real interest rate,
rather than nominal, on which saving and investment depend. Real interest
parity can be tested directly, without most of the econometric problems of
the saving—investment regressions. Mishkin (1984a, 1984b), cumby and
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Obstfeld (1984), Mark (1985), cumby and Mishkin (1986), and Gaab, Granziol
and Homer (1986) find that real interest rates are far from perfectly
correlated across countries.
Many studies test uncovered, or open, interest parity, as a way of
getting at investors' degree of substitutability among countries' bonds.
Almost all of these studies make the rational expectations assumption:
they infer investors' expectations of future exchange rates from the ex
post realizations of the exchange rate in the particular sample period,
arguing that the two differ only by a random expectational error. This
literature, typified by O.xniby and Obstfeld (1984), generally rejects
statistically the hypothesis that the nominal interest differential is an
unbiased estimator of exchange rate changes and interprets these findings
as a rejection of uncovered interest parity. It thus constitutes a third
challenge to the conventional wisdom and offers the exchange risk premium,
in particular, as a prime candidate to explain international inequalities
in expected real rates of return.1
A fourth challenge to the conventional view that international
capital mobility is high is represented by Dooley and Isard (1986) and
related papers. They argue that there is an historical tendency for
governments of countries that go substantially into debt to foreigners to
renege on that debt through some combination of capital controls, taxation,
or outright default; because investors everywhere are aware of this
tendency, they are increasingly reluctant to lend to a country as its
international indebtedness rises. While this view of political risk is
standard when applied to LDC debtors, Dooley and Isard (1986) apply it to
industrialized countries as well.—3—
2. The Degreeof(hpital!bi1ityfor Different Kinds of (buntries
Theconventional wisdom asserts, not just that (1) the degree of
capital mobility is high, but also that (2) it is higher for most of the
large industrialized countries than for smaller or less developed countires
and (3) it has been rising since the l950s, and particularly since many
countries dismantled their capital controls after 1973 and &iromarkets
began recycling funds on a large scale. These latter two claims have also
been found wanting by the same statistical criteria used to challenge the
first claim.
Onthequestion of the degree of capital mobility amongdifferent
groups of countries, regression studies of national investment rates
against national saving rates for broader cross sections find that the
coefficient is, if anything, higher for OEO countries than for less—
developed countries: Fieleke (1982; 87 countries), Summers (1985; 115
countries), and Dooley, Frankel and Mathieson (1986; 64 countries).2 This
seems to imply a lower degree of capital mobility for OED countries, which
Fieleke (p.155), Summers (p. 21), Dooley, Frankel and Mathieson, and most
others consider directly contrary to intuition.
Table 1 reports instrumental variables regressions of the investment
rate against the national saving rate for three cross—section sub—groups:
industrialized countries, LD classified (by the International Monetary
Fund) as borrowing primarily from commercial sources, and LDCs classified
as borrowing primarily from foreign governments and official agencies. The
most common econometric source of worry In such regressions is the follow-
ing point: governments endogenously respond to incipient current account
imbalances with policies to change public or private saving In such a way—4—
Thble1: Regressions of (InvestiaentlcNP)against(National SavingIGNP)
InstrumentalVariables Regressions:
Military Ependiture/GNP and Dependency Ratio
Country Group Period Constant Term Coefficient
(and number of countries) (of NS/GNP)
Industrial countries 1960—7 3 —.013 1 .078**
(14 Observations) (.069) (.277)
1974—84 —.039 1 .192**
(.082) (.362)
Market Borrowers 1960—73 .131** 445**
(21 Observations) (.030) (.148)
1974—84 .049 .878**
(.030) (.120)
Official Borrowers 1960—73 .128** .366**
(14 Observations) (.027) (.136)
1974—84 .120** .678**
(.025) (.191)
**Significantat 99 percent level
(Standard errors are given in parenthesis)
See Dooley, Frankel and Mathieson (1986) for further results.
Data Sources
GDP at market prices, (Y) gross domestic investment, (I) and gross
domestic savings (NS) are conventional national income concepts drawn from
World Bank EPDNA data files •Theage dependency ratio is the ratio of
dependent population (under 16 and over 64) to working age population (15
to 64) drawn from the same source. Military expenditures are from data
files of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The definitions for
official borrowers, market borrowers and combined borrowers as well as
lists of countries in each category can be found on pages 173—174 of the
International Monetary Fund's 1986 World Economic()itlook.—5—
as to reduce the imbalances. This "policy reaction" argument has been made
by Fieleke (1982), Tobin (1983), Westphal (1983), Caprio and Howard (1984)
and Summers (1985). The two instrumental variables used here to deal with
this problem, or with any other source of endogeneity of national saving,
are the ratio of dependents to working—age population, considered a good
Instrument for the private saving rate, and the ratio of military
expenditure to GNP, considered a good instrument for the public sector
(dis—)saving rate.3 tn every case the saving coefficient is significantly
greater than zero, suggesting a degree of crowding out of investment, or ——
inFeldstein—Horioka's interpretation ——imperfectcapital mobility. The
coefficient is even higher, indeed is insignificantly different from 1.0,
for the industrialized countries. It is also slightly higher for the
market borrowers than for the official borrowers, again the counter—
intuitive result. Formal tests of the hypothesis that the coefficient for
industrialized countries is different from that for LDCs, and of the
hypothesis that the coefficient for official borrowers is different from
that for market borrowers, fail to reject equality. (Not reported.)
It should be noted that not everyone's a priori expectations are
that capital mobility should be higher for industrialized countries than
for LDCs, at least by the saving—investment criterion. Indeed, Harberger
(1983, p. 334) criticizes on these grounds Feldstein and Horioka's
conclusion that capital mobility is low for all countries:
The point to be borne in mind here is that the evidence of
the Feldstein—Horioka paper was assembled from the 0ED
countries only. Casting the net wider would have surely
thrown up indications of much greater divergence between
saving and investment rates—6--
On the question of the evolution over time of the degree of capital
mobility, there is no evidence that the coefficient in regressions of
investment on saving rates has fallen over time. This finding emerges both
from cross—section studies, which often report pre— and post—1973 results
——Feldstein(1983), Penati and Dooley (1984), and Dooley, Frankel and
Mathieson (1986) ——andfrom pure time series studies ——Obstfeld
(l986a,b)5 and Frankel (1986) for the United States. In Table 1 the
estimated coefficient actually increases after 1973, for each of the three
sets of countries. Similar results hold for tests of interest parity.
Mishkin (1984, P. 1352), for example, found even more significant
rejections of real interest parity among major industrialized countries for
the floating rate period after 1973/TI than he did for his entire 1967/11-
1979111 sample period. Caramazza et al (1986, pp. 43—47) also found that
some of the major industrialized countries in the 1980s (1980.1—1985.6)
moved farther from real interest parity than they had been in the 1970s
(1973 .7—1979 .12)
3.Decoaposition Using Forward Rate Data
Giventhe disparity between the results reported above and a priori
expectations ——notjust that capital mobility is high, but also that it is
higher for open industrialized countries than for LDCS and that it has
increased over time —onemust wonder whether tests based on saving—
investment correlations or on real interest differentials are giving us the
right answer. This paper breaks up the real interest differential into its
components in order to shed light on these questions. The real interest
differential is defined as—7—
r —r=(1— — (1*— (1)
where r is the real interest rate, i is the nominal interest rate,
itis the expected Inflation rate and asterisks represent foreign
variables. Ourdecompositionis
r —r*=(i—i*—fd)+ (fd e) + (e —it+ ir*) (2)
where fd is the forward discount and ASe is the expected rate of
depreciation of the domestic currency.
The first term is the covered interest differential. The interest
rates I and j* refer to local rates in the two countries. We claim
that the international covered interest differential is the appropriate
measure of the degree of capital mobility, in the sense of the degree of
integration of financial markets across political boundaries. In the
absence of substantial transactions costs, information costs, capital
controls, risk of future capital controls and default risk, the mean and
variability of the covered interest differential should be small. We
follow the tradition of Aliber (1973) in calling this differential the
"political" premium, though "country" premium would be just as good.
We view it as no longer interesting to test covered interest parity
with interest rates observed in the same Eurocurrency market as the forward
discount, other than as a test for errors In the data. This condition has
already been well—established.6 Rather than artificially setting up a
hypothesis of market efficiency to be tested statistically, we believe that
the interesting question is to quantify the size of the covered interest
differentials and thereby the barriers to international capital mobility.
We take It for granted that these barriers are essentially zero within the—8—
London eurocurrency market. One would anticipate that somecountries
within our sample have by the 1980s become so open and efficient finan—
daily as to constitute part of the world eurocurrency market; but this is
something that should emerge from our calculations.
The other two terms have to do with the currency in question rather
than the political jurisdiction per se. They may be called the exchange
risk premium and expected real depreciation, respectively. Given the clear
empirical failure of purchasing power parity, there is no reason why the
last term should necessarily be zero. A non—zero expected rate of real
depreciation would in itself open up a real interest differential even if
the political and exchange risk premiums were zero. Thus real interest
parity could be invalidated by imperfect integration of goods markets rather
than imperfect integration of financial markets .7 Nevertheless several
authors, while recognizing the point in theory, continue to identify real
interest differentials with some combination of political premiums and
exchange risk premiums.
"The incomplete linkage of real interest rates inter-
nationally appears to reflect risk premiums which vary with
the size of a nation's foreign borrowing."
Darby (1986, p. 420)
"There are two major reasons why expected real interest rate
may fail to be equal across countries ...Ina world with
risk—averse investors, differences in risk will lead to
differences in expected returns ...Adifferential in
expected real returns across countries may also be due to
market segmentation or barriers to capital movements across
currencies ."
Koraczyk(1985, p. 350)
This paper uses forward market data to decompose the real interest
differential into its three components. Many tests of covered interest—9—
parity already exist. &it none to our knowledge goes beyond a small sample
of a few countries. We use forward rate series quoted by Barclay's Bank in
London (and reported by DRI) for 24 countries between September 1982 and
March 1987. The sample includes small as well as large countries, coun-
tries with as well as without capital controls, and less developed as well
as industrialized countries. En using covered interest differentials as
the test of financial market integration versus segmentation for a
(relatively) large cross—section of countries, we can see how well this
criterion of capital mobility corresponds to the real interest differential
and other criteria that have been proposed.
To state our findings in advance, the largest industrialized
countries, and a few others that are known to have an absence of capital
controls, by our criterion of covered interest parity show (unsurprisingly)
a higher degree of financial market integration than do other countries.
The deviations from real interest parity are generally much greater than
the deviations from covered interest parity, suggesting that currency
factors, due to exchange rate variability, are a larger source of the
failure of real interest parity in the 1980s than are barriers to the flow
of capital across political jurisdictions. There is no reason to doubt the
correctness of conclusions, drawn from the Feldstein—Horioka tests or real
interest parity tests, regarding the "crowding out" effects of changes in
national saving. Bat these tests are not the correct criteria for
measuring the degree of international capital mobility in the sense of the
degree of integration of financial markets across countries.—10—
4. Deviations from a1 Interest Parity
Table 2a reports statistics on three—month real interest differen-
tials for our 24 countries, in each case the local interest rate measured
relative to the Eurodollar interest rate. For local interest rates we use
the interbank rate or, where no market rate exists, the most flexibly—
determined interest rate available. (See data appendix for details.) We
begin by using simply the realized inflation rates during the ex post
three—month period, on the assumption that cx ante expected inflation rates
cannot be very far off over such a short term. (We will be using ex ante
inflation forecasts below.)
Column (1) reports the mean real interest differential during the
sample period, 1982 to 1987. The numbers are negative for a majority of
countries, averaging —1.79 percent across all 24, which reflects the high
level of real dollar interest rates during this sample period. The mean is
statistically significant for most groups of countries.
The countries are classified into five groups chosen on a priori
grounds. The group with real interest rates the farthest below the world
rate is Mexico, South Africa, Greece and Bahrain. These four (very
diverse) countries bear the burden of representing a wide class of LDCs in
our sample. There are seven countries classified as LDCs that happen to
have forward rate data available, and thereby appear in our sample; three
East Asian LDGs that are known to have liberalized financial markets (Hong
Kong, Singapore and Malaysia) are classified separately. One might object
that the large negative real interest differentials in the group of four
reflect administered local interest rates that are kept artificially low by
"financial repression." &ttcountriescannot maintain artifically lowTable 2b: Real Interest Differential (ex ante)






Constant Interest Forwardlyr Lag of Projected
Difference Discount Inflation Real mt.Dif.
(5) (6) (7) (8)
OpenAtlantic DCs
Canada 0.44 -0.07 0.00 —0.44 0.67
Germany 1.59 0.13 0.84 —0.09 1.18
Netherlands 3.72 —1.50 2.83 1.07 1.79
Switzerland 1.74 —0.11 1.10 0.69 1.88
United Kingdom_3.17**-6.62 6.41 1.80 2.00
Group -0.37 -0.59 1.13 -0.25 1.58
Open Asian LDCs
Hong Kong —1.35 2.16 —0.90 -0.49 1.68
Malaysia 0.64 0.46 0.23** —0.44 2.01
Singapore 1.98 0.26 0.34 0.29 0.47
Group -0.30 0.32 0.47 -0.61 1.47
Closed LDCs
Bahrain 12.70 1.47 0.11 1.17 2.14
Greece -18.57** 0.13 _0.33** 0.99 2.96
Mexico —16.49 1.02 0.68** 0.08 8.96
South Africa 2.03**0.43** 0.00 —0.97 3.39
Group —0.21 0.71 —0.36 —0.48 4.92
Other European DCs
Austria 0.19 1.27 —0.23 0.43 1.34
Belgium 1.14 -0.33 0.61 -0.79 1.44
Denmark -2.29 1.39 —0.55 0.96 1.78
France 0.10 1.71 —0.65 0.52** 1.84
Ireland 3.79 -0.00 0.06 .0.91** 2.19
Italy —2.60 0.83 —0.60 0.09 2.02
Norway 0.02 2.52 —2.27 0.27 1.49
Spain -5.15 1.71 —0.65 0.10 3.22
Sweden —6.23 3.98 —2.25 0.38 2.68
Group -0.51 0.97 —0.31 -0.46 2.07
Liberalizing Pacific DCs
Australia -0.12 0.40 —0.08 —0.26 1.15
Japan 1.86** —2.87 3.43 0.57 1.31
New Zealand -5.15 -0.73 0.43 1.16 3.73
Group —1.13 —0.00 0.06 0.26 2.37
All Countries —0.16 0.85 —0.36 -0.56 2.65
*Group standard deviations calculated with deviations around each country's mean.
**Djfferent from zero with 95'hconfidence.Table 2a: Real Interest Differentials (ex post)
Interest Differential Less Inflation Differential
Local vs. Eurodollar




Sample Error MeanStandard Squared 95Y,
* of ObsMeanOf Mean* <> zero Deviation ErrorBand**
Open Atlantic DCs (1) (2) (3) (4)
Canada 49 -0.27 0.49 0.41 1.98 2.00 3.97
Germany 50 —1.75 0.67 0.98 2.72 3.25 6.03
Netherlands 49 -1.75 0.78 0.96 3.17 3.63 6.57
Switzerland 50 —3.31 0.81 1.00 3.31 4.71 8.45
United Kingdom 50 -0.26 0.82 0.24 3.35 3.36 5.58
Group 248 -1.47 0.32 1.00 2.93 3.47
Open Asian LDCs
Hong Kong 50 -2.77 1.25 0.96 5.11 5.83 12.02
Malaysia 37 1.91 1.20 0.86 4.22 4.64 8.18
Singapore 50 0.01 0.87 0.01 3.53 3.53 7.06
Group 137 —0.49 0.64 0.78 4.31 4.74
Closed LDCs
Bahrain 48 3.03 1.21 0.98 4.86 5.75 10.61
Greece 50 —9.51 2.16 1.00 8.80 13.03 20.92
Mexico 50-12.38 3.60 1.00 14.69 19.29 39.13
South Africa 49 —3.96 1.26 0.99 5.10 6.49 14.27
Group 197 —5.80 1.14 1.00 9.24 12.40
Other European DCs
Austria 49 -2.87 0.91 0.99 3.67 4.68 8.81
Belgium 50 —0.16 0.68 0.18 2.77 2.78 4.88
Denmark 50 —4.09 1.04 1.00 4.24 5.92 9.70
France 50 -1.29 0.67 0.93 2.73 3.02 5.83
Ireland 48 0.31 0.83 0.28 3.31 3.32 6.03
Italy 48 0.49 0.92 0.40 3.69 3.72 5.94
Norway 50 —0.64 0.78 0.57 3.20 3.26 6.74
Spain 50 —1.08 1.27 0.59 5.19 5.30 11.43
Sweden 50 —0.73 1.11 0.48 4.54 4.60 8.67
Group 445 —1.13 0.31 1.00 3.75 4.16
r_:£:_ r,' I_JJIaJ.LL.LuIy ØLJL iJL
Australia 49 0.30 0.91 0.26 3.67 3.68 6.49
Japan 49 -1.03 0.78 0.79 3.17 3.34 6.01
New Zealand 50 0.16 2.41 0.05 9.84 9.84 15.60
Group 148 -0.19 0.90 0.58 6.32 6.35
All Countries 1175 —1.79 0.27 1.00 5.34 6.51
*Calculated assuming N/3 independent observations.
+Group standard deviations calculated with deviations around each country's mean.
**The size of a band around zero which includes 95'!. of the observations.
DCs are developed countries, LDCs less developed countries.111F designations.—12—
correlations because countries in both groups, six of the total sevens fall
into the "market borrower" classification used in the preceding section.
(only Bahrain is classified as an official borrower.)
The result in Table 2 that real interest differentials are more
variable for LDCS than for industrialized countries suggests that the
saving—investment correlations are not picking up the degree of equali-
zation of real rates of return. One possibility is that sensitivity of
physical investment to the real rate of interest in domestic financial
markets varies across countries. Let the investment rate be given by
(I/Y).=a—br.+c. (3)
Presumably b, the sensitivity of physical investment to the real interest
rate, would be higher in OED countries than in LDCs; in the latter, more
investment is financed out of retained earnings, family wealth or
government credit than by issuing debt or equity in the marketplace. Then
the covariance of investment and saving rates can be written
Cov(I/Y, NS/Y) =—bCov(r_r*, NS/Y) 4 b Cov(r*, NS/Y)
+ 0v(c,NS/Y) (4)
If the "large—country" and other endogeneity problems have been solved,
i.e., r* and c can both be assumed uncorrelated with the saving rate
(NS/Y) so that the last two terms drop out, then
Cov(I/Y,NS/Y)=—bCov(r_r*, NS/Y) . (5)
We can now see how even if two countries have the same Cov(r_r*, NS/Y),—11—
interest rates without barriers to capital outflow: these statistics
reflect a low degree of capital mobility precisely as we want them to. In
this respect our group of four is typical. A number of studies, including
much larger LDC samples than available here, have shown the extremes to
which LDC real interest rates can go, particularly some very negative
levels in the 1970s 8
As with the other measures of interest rate differentials that we
will be considering below, the mean is not always the most useful
statistic. A small mean over a particular sample period may hide fluc-
tuations of the differential in both directions. Even if a mean is statis-
tically significant,9 it is useful to know in addition the variability of
the differential. The standard deviation is reported in column (2). We
also report the root mean squared error (ENSE) in column (3); this would be
a superior measure of how closely the rates are tied together if, for
example, we are worried about the possibility of a large differential that
is fairly constant over time because of government administration of
interest rates. Finally we report in column (4) how big a band would have
to be to encompass 95 percent of the deviations from real interest parity.
Country—group comparisons of the measures of real interest differ—
ential variability In some respects suit a priori expectations much better.
than do the saving—Investment correlations reported in the preceding
section. The industrialized countries generally have less variable real
interest differentials than the LDCs. New Zealand is the main exception,
with a high variability. Within the group of seven LDGs, the three open
Asian countries come closer to real interest parity than the four closed
countries •itthis comparison sheds little light on the saving—investment—14—
might expect the coefficient on the nominal interest differential to be
close to 1.0 and that on the lagged inflation rate close to —1.0. But for
many individual countries the coefficients are not even of the right
sign.1' When coefficients are constrained to be the same across countries
within groups, they are much more sensible.
Column (8) reports the standard deviation of our projected real
interest differential. The variation of the projected real interest
differential in column (8) is less than that of the ex post real interest
differential in column (2) confirming that a part of the movement in infla-
tion rates was not forecastable. But the results are nevertheless similar
to those in Table 2a. Again, the group of four closed LDcs is the group
with the most variable real interest differentials, though Spain and New
Zealand are also quite high. Singapore has the least variable ex ante real
interest differential, followed by Canada, Germany, Japan and Norway.
5. The POlitical Factors, 1presented by the Q)vered Interest
Differential
We now use the Barclay's forward rate data to decompose the real
interest differential into one part due to political factors and another
due to currency factors:
r_r*=(i_i*_fd)+(fd_+*) • (6)
The first component, the covered interest differential, encompasses all
factors related to the political jurisdiction in which the asset is
issued. This includes both existing capital controls and the risk of
future capital controls, as well as transfer risk, default risk, etc. The
second component, which might be called the "real forward discount,"—13---
investment in the OED country might suffer more crowding out, because of a
higher "b", than investment in the LDC.
The measures of real interest differential variability show some
results that are anomalous if they are taken to be tests of financial
market integration. For example France, which had stringent capital
controls at least during the early part of our sample period, appears to
have a higher degree of capital mobility by the criterion of real interest
differential variability than Japan, which announced liberalization of its
capital controls before our sample period (1979—80). One might conceivably
argue that the Japanese liberalization must not have been genuine.10
the French real interest differential is smaller and less variable even
than those of the Netherlands and Switzerland (and, by the RMSE statistic,
Germany and the United Kingdom as well), major industrialized countries
that are known to be virtually free of capital controls. Only nada, of
all 24 countries, shows a smaller and less variable real interest differ-
ential, by all measures, than France.
It can be objected that the real interest rate measures reported
above are invalid because they use ex post inflation rates, which investors
could not have known at the beginning of each three—month period. Table 2b
reports the results of projecting ex post inflation rates on a constant
term and three relevant variables known to investors: the lagged inflation
differential (over the preceding year), the three—month interest differen-
tial (the same one appearing in the real interest differential itself), and
the three—month forward discount (which is examined more fully below).
Qñumns (5), (6) and (7) report the estimated coefficients on these three
variables. In forecasting the ex post real interest differential, oneTable 3Covered Interest Differential





Sample Error MeanStandard Squared 95'!.
# of ObsMean Of Mean <> zero Deviation ErrorBand**
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open Atlantic DCs
Canada 54 -0.05 0.03 0.94 0.19 0.20 0.37
Germany 55 0.38 0.03 1.00 0.25 0.46 0.77
Netherlands 55 0.23 0.02 1.00 0.14 0.27 0.45
Switzerland 55 0.46 0.03 1.00 0.22 0.51 0.80
United Kingdom 55 -0.13 0.03 1.00 0.22 0.25 0.43
Group 274 0.18 0.02 1.00 0.20 0.36
Open Asian LDCS
Hong Kong 55 0.11 0.03 1.00 0.25 0.27 0.46
Malaysia '+3 —1.62 0.23 1.00 1.51 2.23 3.77
Singapore 53 -0.27 0.04 1.00 0.28 0.39 0.64
Group 151 -0.52 0.12 1.00 0.83 1.21
Closed LDCS
Bahrain 48 -2.23 0.17 1.00 1.18 2.55 4.22
Greece 53 -9.68 0.86 1.00 6.28 11.62 20.39
Mexico 43—16.80 1.87 1.00 12.28 20.97 29.39
South Africa 53 —1.52 1.47 0.69 10.71 10.82 2.76
Group 197 —7.23 1.06 1.00 8.58 12.75
Other European DCs
Austria 54 —1.65 0.21 1.00 1.54 2.27 4.52
Belgium 55 0.08 0.04 0.96 0.27 0.29 0.60
Denmark 53 -3.52 0.24 1.00 1.76 3.97 6.75
France 55 —2.06 0.39 1.00 2.89 3.56 7.93
Ireland 55 —0.97 0.56 0.91 4.19 4.30 7.80
Italy 55 2.13 0.48 1.00 3.56 4.16 6.71
Norway 55 —2.12 0.49 1.00 3.67 4,25 13.96
Spain 55 -3.05 0.49 1.00 3.64 4.76 9.01
Sweden 55 -0.31 0.06 1.00 0.47 0.56 0.85
Group 492 —1.27 0.22 1.00 2.79 3.48
Liberalizing Pacific DCs
Australia 55 —0.83 0.29 0.99 2.14 2.29 3.33
Japan 54 0.15 0.03 1.00 0.19 0.24 0.43
New Zealand 55 —1.86 0.35 1.00 2.62 3.22 6.27
Group 164 —0.85 0.26 1.00 1.95 2.28
All Countries 1278 -1.73 0.19 1.00 3.86 5.52
i-See Table 2a for notes.—15—
encompasses factors related to the currency of denomination of the asset.
It consists, in particular, of the exchange risk premium plus expected real
depreciation, as we have seen. These factors are distinct from the
question of international capital mobility narrowly defined.
Column (1) of Table 3 reports the mean of the covered interest
differential for each of our 24 countries.12 A good rule of thumb, when
the absolute magnitude of the mean or the variability of the differential
indicates the existence of significant barriers, is: a negative differen-
tial vis—a—vis the Eurocurrency market indicates that, to the extent
barriers exist, they are capital controls or transactions costs currently
operating to discourage capital from flowing out of the country. Investors
would not settle for a lower return domestically if they were free to earn
abroad the higher return covered to eliminate exchange risk. This is the
case for all of the LDCs in the sample, with the exception of Hong Kong,
and for all of the small European countries •Thenegative differential
that existed for the United Kingdom before Margaret Thatcher removed
capital controls in 1979 is now extremely small.'3 Similarly, Canada's
differential is effectively zero (as shown, e.g., by Hootheetal, 1985,
p. 112). Column (4), the size of the band wide enough to encompass 95
percent of deviations from international covered interest parity, can be
compared with the approach of Frenkel and Levich (1977). They tested a
larger band meant to represent transactions costs between pound and dollar
securities (1.0 percent for the spot and forward transactions alone, July
1973 —May1975, p. 1215). They found, for the case of the United Kingdom,
that a smaller percentage of deviations (87.6 —89.7percent, p. 1217) fell
within the band; this confirms again that capital mobility has increased
since the 1970s.—16—
Germany is one of the few cases showing a higher interest rate
locally than offshore, which suggests some barriers discouraging capital
inf low: investors would not settle for a lower mark return in the Euro—
market if they were free to get the higher return in Germany.But themag-
nitude is small, as it has been observed to be ever since Germany removed
most of its controls on capital inflow in 1974 (Dooley and Isard, 1980; and
Giavazzi and Pagano, 1985, p. 27). By either the criteria of the mean or
of the variability measures reported in the next two columns, there is also
high capital mobility for Switzerland and, especially, the Netherlands,two
other &iropean countries that are widely thought to have open financial
markets.
Japan has a covered differential that by all measures Is smaller
than Switzerland and Germany, let alone France and the smaller European
countries. This might come as a surprise to those accustomed to thinking
of Japanese financial markets in terms of the large barriers to capital
inf low that were in place In the l970s. The liberalization of Japanese
markets, which has been documented elsewhere, continued during our sample
period.14 1though foreign residents have been free to hold many Japanese
assets since 1979, such as the three—month Gensaki upon which most tests of
covered interest parity (including ours) are based, calculations using the
Interest rate on Japanese certificates of deposit (not reported) show that
liberalization In this market did not occur until April 1985.
The covered interest differential for France is much larger and more
variable than that for the other major Industrialized countries known tobe
free of capital controls. In the cases of Switzerland and the Netherlands
in particular, this is the reverse of the finding from the criterion of
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tenon of covered interest differentials as the proper test of financial
market integration. The differential, with its negative sign signifying
controls on French capital outflows, has been previously studied,
especially its tendency to shoot up shortly before devaluations of the
franc.15 Ritourdata indicates that the last major occurrence of this
phenomenon was February 1986; since then the differential has been close to
zero. Similarly, the same phenomenon that has been observed for Italy
(e.g., Giavazzi and Pagano, 1985) appears to have ended after the March 22
1983 EMS realignment. Indeed the differential, which was zero by the time
Giavazzi and Pagano's sample period ended in late 1984, turned suddenly
positive in 1985. One possible explanation is that beginning in 1985
investor preferences shifted toward holding lira assets, and that existing
controls prevented sufficient inflow to equalize lira interest rates •&it
a contrary possibility must be noted: in situations when ——onthe basis
of either large domestic or international indebtedness, political
instability or a past history of controls on outflow ——onemight a priori
expect the local environment to be risky (i.e., riskier than the Eurodollar
market), an observed positive differential might not be attributable to
existing controls on inflow. In such circumstances a positive differential
might be attributable rather to the risk of future controls on outflow, or
of default or other penalty. The higher interest rate onshore than
offshore is then the compensation necessary to induce investors voluntarily
to hold risky local assets. This sort of default risk premium is more
familiar in the context of long—term bonds and loans than with the three—
month deposits studied here, but there is no reason why it could not
apply.16 A similar ambiguity pertains to Belgium as to Italy; the mean of
the differential is positive, but its lack of statistical significance—18--
suggests that it might be an equilibrium rate of return (we are using the
Belgian financial franc exchange rate rather than the commercial franc
rate) and not a sign of barriers (even small ones) to capital inf low as in
Germany.
Registering impressively open markets are our three East Asian
LDCs. Hong Kong and Singapore show smaller covered interest differentials
even than some open industrialized countries like Germany and Switzer-
land. Malaysia's differential is considerably higher, but still compares
favorably with most European countries.'7 Similarly, Australia and New
Zealand, both of which have begun to liberalize their financial markets,
lie in the middle ground. In the case of Australia there is evidence of
the liberalization within the sample period: the frequently large negative
covered differential that had been observed up to mid 198318 largely
vanished thereafter.
Not surprisingly, our remaining LDCs, Mexico, Greece, Bahrain and
South Africa, show by far the largest and most variable covered interest
differentials. (Bahrain19 shows a smaller differential than the others,
and even than some of the European countries with controls, like Denmark,
Norway and Spain.) Again, the results are precisely what one would expect
if covered interest differentials are the proper criterion for capital
mobility, but precisely the reverse of what the saving—investment criterion
shows.
6. Qirrency Factors, Represented by the Real Forward Discount
Table 4 reports the statistics for the other part of the real
interest differential, the real forward discount. In addition to the sta—Table 4a: Real Forward Discount (ex post)





Sample Error MeanStandard Squared 95%
4* of ObsMean Of Mean* <> zero Deviation ErrorBand**
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open Atlantic DCs
Canada 49 -0.23 0.48 0.36 1.96 1.97 4.03
Germany 50 —2.18 0.69 0.99 2.81 3.57 6.63
Netherlands 49 -1.99 0.80 0.98 3.23 3.81 6.46
Switzerland 50 -3.80 0.83 1.00 3.38 5.11 8.91
United Kingdom 50 -0.15 0.85 0.14 3.46 3.46 5.97
Group 248 -1.67 0.33 1.00 3.00 3.70
Open Asian LDCs
Hong Kong 50 -2.88 1.25 0.96 5.11 5.88 12.17
Malaysia 48 2.45 1.27 0.93 5.09 5.66 10.26
Singapore 50 0.28 0.87 0.24 3.56 3.57 7.10
Group 148 -0.09 0.66 0.55 4.61 5.10
Closed LDCs
Bahrain 49 5.13 1.21 1.00 4.91 7.13 12.26
Greece 50 0.32 2.35 0.10 9.60 9.61 16.67
Mexico 43 4.10 3.60 0.72 13.62 14.24 24.49
South Africa 50 —2.44 3.02 0.57 12.35 12.59 15.42
Group 192 1.67 1.31 0.90 10.47 11.03
Other European DCs
Austria 49 —1.14 0.92 0.77 3.71 3.88 7.75
Belgium 50 -0.24 0.70 0.26 2.85 2.86 5.00
Denmark 50 —0.57 1.12 0.38 4.58 4.62 7.12
France 50 0.88 0.63 0.82 2.57 2.72 3.99
Ireland 48 0.60 1.26 0.36 5.02 5.06 6.93
Italy 48 -1.33 0.89 0.84 3.57 3.81 7.29
Norway 50 0.40 0.72 0.41 2.95 2.98 5.67
Spain 50 2.14 1.33 0.87 5.45 5.86 10.45
Sweden 50 —0.42 1.13 0.28 4.60 4.62 8.14
Group 445 0.04 0.33 0.55 4.00 4.13
Liberalizing Pacific DCs
Australia 49 1.16 1.02 0.73 4.13 4.29 6.75
Japan 49 —1.19 0.80 0.84 3.24 3.46 6.24
New Zealand 50 2.04 2.59 0.56 10.56 10.76 15.58
Group 148 0.68 0.97 0.76 6.80 6.96
All Countries 1181 0.01 0.29 0.51 5.83 6.19
*See Table 2a for notes.Table 4b: Real Forward Discount (ex ante)











































*Group standard deviations calculated with deviations around each country's mean.—19—
tisticsusing ex post inflation rates, the last column reports the varia-
bility of the ex ante real forward discount, with the inflation rates pro-
jected on the same three variables as in Table 2b.2° It is clear why some
of the countries that have highly open capital markets by the covered inte-
rest parity definition —i.e.,no barriers to the flow of capital across
political boundaries per se ——neverthelessexhibit significant deviations
from real interest parity. The currency premium is the difference.
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and Switzerland, for example, all
have substantial real forward discounts, fd —(it — ¶*), whichconstitute
approximately the entirety of their real interest differentials,
I —1*—('it — .it*) •21These are countries with currencies that have experi-
enced a lot of exchange rate variability, both nominal and real, vis—a—vis
the dollar since 1973, and especially since 1980.22 As a consequence, some
combination of exchange risk premiums and expected real depreciation ——
factorspertaining to the currency, not to political jurisdiction ——
producesthe gap in real interest rates •Forthese four financially—open
Industrialized countries, and f or Hong Kong as well, the currency factors
produce a negative real differential even though the covered interest
differential is positive:the small controls or frictions that remain
are, if anything, working to resist capital inflow into these countries,
not outflow as one would mistakenly conclude from the real interest
differential criterion. The other countries all have highly variable
currency premiums as well. Indeed, the real forward discount (currency
premium) is more variable than the covered interest differential (political
premium) for all but five of our countries (France, Greece, Italy, Mexico
and Norway). The last row of Thbles 4a and 2a shows that the average—20—
variability across all 24 countries is higher for the real forward discount
than for the covered interest differential.
Thus many of our countries, such as Canada, the United Kingdom and
Germany, apparently can borrow abroad if they wish to, without having to
pay a substantial country risk premium, contrary to the Darby sentence
quoted in section 3. The only qualifications are that (1) they might have
to issue the debt in foreign currency to be sure of paying no exchange risk
premium, fd —5e,and (2) the borrowing may force the real interest rate
above world levels nevertheless, if it is associated with expected future
real depreciation of the currency,
—( —
7•FurtherDecomposition into Exchange Risk Premium andExpected
Peal Depreciation
Ourdecompositionso far has lumped two terms, the exchange risk
premium and expected real depreciation, together into the currency premium:
fd—¶+¶* =(fd
—e)+ (e —ir+ff*)
En this section we attempt to complete the decomposition by separating
these two terms •Todo so requires a measure or model of expected
depreciation As. The usual approach is to use the ex post changes in the
spot rate and argue that under rational expectations the
expectational error ts,÷1 — should be random (uncorrelated
with information currently available at time t).
Column (1) of Ible 5a reports the mean value of fd —ts for
t t÷1
each of our countries. Any study of bias in the forward rate that is unf or——21—
tunate enough to use data from the early l980s alone would show almostall
currencies paying negative exchange risk premiums vis—a—vis thedollar, to
a degree that appeared statistically significant even on a fewyears of
data. This is just another way of saying that until 1985 the dollar
systematically appreciated against other currencies to an extent not
forecast by their forward rates. it our sample now includes datathrough
1987, including two years of dollar depreciation against the othermajor
currencies. Most of the means are positive, showing that thestrong dollar
period dominates. (The exceptions, currencies that depreciated ata more
rapid rate against the dollar than the forward discount, were the Canadian
dollar, Hong Kong dollar, Singapore dollar, Saudi Arabian riyal, South
African rand, and Australian dollar.) &tt the Saudiriyal is the only one
that shows a statistically significant mean riskpremium of either
sign.22 Furthermore thesign is usually the opposite of the sign of the
mean real interest differential during the same period (Table 2a, column
(1)), i.e., this measure of the mean return differential doesnot explain
any positive part of the mean real interest differential.
The measures of variability offd — ,whichshow up very
large in columns (2), (3) and (4), are measures of thevariability of ex
post return differentials, not ex ante. They tell us little about the
variability of the exchange risk premium. &it the second moments do tell
us two things. flrst, they provide an obvious explanation ——lowpower ——
whythe first moments might not be statistically significant. Themagni-
tude of the error term is widely agreed to be muchlarger than the magni-
tude of the error term in forecasting inflation,or than the magnitude of
the forward discount or exchange risk premium, making itmore difficult inTable 5a: Exchange Risk Premium (ex post)




Standard t ProbSample+ Mean
Sample Error MeanStandard Squared 95X
* of ObsMeanOf Mean* <> zero Deviation ErrorBand**
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open Atlantic DCs
Canada 52 —0.56 2.10 021 8.74 8.76 16.95
Germany 52 3.93 6.37 0.45 26.53 26.83 44.23
Netherlands 52 3.78 6.52 0.43 27.13 27.39 44.91
Switzerland 52 3.47 6.70 0.39 27.88 28.10 46.77
United Kingdom 52 0.10 6.65 0.01 27.67 27.67 41.59
Group 260 2.15 2.64 0.79 24.54 24.71
Open Asian LDCs
Hong Kong 52 -4.11 2.86 0.83 11.92 12.62 25.91
Malaysia 52 0.27 2.56 0.08 10.68 10.68 19.93
Singapore 52 -1.25 2.44 0.38 10.15 10.23 18.76
Group 156 -1.70 1.51 0.87 10.87 11.15
Closed LDCs
Greece 52 0.99 6.42 0.12 26.72 26.74 46.22
Mexico 43 6.42 13.34 0.36 50.50 50.92 89.54
Saudi Arabia 52 -1.78 0.74 0.97 3.07 3.56 5.94
South Africa 52 -5.65 11.16 0.38 46.48 46.83 84.13
Group 199 —0.30 4.40 0.53 35.83 36.09
Other European DCs
Austria 52 6.69 6.35 0.69 26.44 27.29 49.09
Belgium 52 7.61 5.87 0.79 24.46 25.64 44.75
Denmark 52 7.08 5.94 0.75 24.72 25.73 43.91
France 52 7.41 6.05 0.76 25.20 26.29 42.98
Ireland 52 6.27 6.16 0.68 25.66 26.43 45.23
Italy 52 6.40 5.28 0.76 21.98 22.91 37.05
Norway 52 4.84 5.42 0.62 22.55 23.07 39.30
Spain 52 6.08 5.31 0.73 22.10 22.94 31.71
Sweden 52 5.11 5.07 0.67 21.10 21.72 39.05
Group 468 6.39 1.89 1.00 23.66 24.53
Liberalizing Pacific DCs
Australia 52 —2.06 8.40 0.19 34.96 35.02 72.11
Japan 52 10.24 6.06 0.89 25.21 27.25 53.50
New Zealand 52 3.77 9.42 0.31 39.22 39.41 86.97
Group 156 3.98 4.64 0.80 33.43 34.04
All Countries 1239 3.10 1.30 0.99 26.41 26.90
*See Table Ea for notes.Table 5b: Exchange Risk Premium (ex ante)
Forward Discount Less Predicted Exchange Depreciation
Sept. 1982 —Dec.1986
Percent p.a.
*Group standard deviations calculated with deviations around
**Djfferent from zero with 957. confidence.





































































Canada —9.22 6.09 4.42 0.98
Germany 51.06** 18.50 9.76 1.00
Netherlands 57.01** 21.50 12.75 1.00
Switzerland 50.25 18.52 5.38 0.99
United Kingdom -21.61 20.87 9.18 1.00
Group 9.67** 17.86
Open Asian LDCs
Hong Kong 1.54 4.02 1.01 0.58
Malaysia —2.97 3.73 0.85 0.51
Singapore —14.33 2.95 0.67 0.41
Group —1.92 3.56
Closed LDCs
Greece —76.22** 16.13 2.79 0.92
Mexico -147.73 27.56 1.53 0.74
Saudi Arabia —6.84 1.29 0.35 0.21
South Africa —40.60 14.60 0.52 0.32
Group —6.03 17.02
Other European DCs
Austria 34.27** 20.57 14.61 1.00
Belgium 16.35** 14.89 5.06 0.99
Denmark 36.24 ** 15.43 8.51 1.00
France 18.80 12.90 2.92 0.93
Ireland 20.90 15.19 3.86 0.97
Italy 1.45 10.56 2.29 0.88
Norway —11.07 11.17 5.03 0.99
Spain 63.65** 11.98 2.12 0.86
Sweden —24.63 16.41 6.79 1.00
Group 15.48 14.51
Liberalizing Pacific DCs
Australia —24.69 2.85 —1.43 4.39 14.04 1.09 0.61
Japan 40.52 -12.20 20.58 3.43 13.30 1.91 0.83
New Zealand —29.73 2.89 —1.37 4.02 21.93 3.45 0.95
Group 0.12 1.70 —2.02 2.34 16.77






























—4.91Table 5c: Exchange Risk Premium (ex ante)
Forward Discount Less Forecast Exchange Depreciation
SLJR on Groups using Non—Overlapping Data
Sept. 1982 —Dec.1986
Percent p.a.
*Group standard deviations calculated with deviations
+Used a separate intercept for each country.
**Djfferent from zero with 95% confidence.
around each country's mean.
Regression Coefficients
Constant Interest
4$ of Obs Difference
(5)





















Canada 18—5.35 —16.01 18.99 6.12 5.94 1.00
Germany 1840,55**-3,05 14.21 16.71 10.25 1.00
Netherlands 1830.82** 2.78 7.29 18.11 14.08 1.00
Switzerland 1836.68** 9.75 -1.36 14.90 5.24 1.00
United Kingdom 18—17.34 50.00 —39.16 19.90 11.53 1.00
Group 90 + -7.84 14.07 15.89 26.41 1.00
Open Asian LDCs
Hong Kong 18 3.04 —9.89 12.75 6.29 6.69 1.00
















Greece 18-83.87 '4.98 1.23 2,87 19.70 1.55 0.78
Mexico 15-96.94 —1.68 -0.22 4,09** 31.67 2.12 0.89
Saudi Arabia 16—4.62 0.22 -1.32 —0.44 1.31 0.86 0.53
South Africa 17—17.90 6.31 -4.62 —1,83 9.61 0.19 0.10
Group 33 + —0.09 0.07 —0.21 18.92 0.05 0.01
Other European DCs
Austria 1826.86** 6.69** 1.87 14.12 16.24 1.00
Belgium 1811.50-0.21 4.57 9.59 7.08 1.00
Denmark 1824.82** 4.70** 1.72 11.51 9.89 1.00
France 18 9.07 5.75 —0.20 —3.41 5.50 2.13 0.90
Ireland 18 0.37 2.99 1.13 —2.52 13.47 7.00 1.00
Italy 18 4.89 2.57 0.26 —2.39 4.32 1.13 0,66
Norway 18—8.85 -0.29 3.99**—0.84 7.80 3.20 0.97
Spain 18 27.61 1.83 0.31 -5.40 6.06 1.57 0.80
Sweden 18—20.80 17.36**—8,40 0.46 13.87 8.64 1.00
Group 162 + 1.G8**1.05—1.13 10.24 12.01 1.00
Liberalizing PacificDCs
Australia 18—24.56 —1.03 2.16 4.19 15.53 0.98 0.58
Japan 1833.09 —23.84 32.20 —4.96 13,19 1.94 0.86
New Zealand 18—6.61 6.67 -5.17 1.72 23.15 3.39 0.97
Group 54 5.51 —3.63 2.28 17.81 3.49 0.98Table 6a: Real Exchange Depreciation (ex post)





Sample Error MeanStandard Squared 95%
4$ of ObsMeanOf Mean* <> zero Deviation Error Bancl**
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open Atlantic DCs
Canada 49 1.60 1.87 0.59 7.56 7.73 15.16
Germany 50 —5.20 6.30 0.58 25.72 26.25 44.98
Netherlands 49 —3.90 6.29 0.46 25.42 25.72 43.78
Switzerland 50 —6.46 6.57 0.66 26.82 27.61 45.68
United Kingdom 50 1.15 6.57 0.14 26.81 26.83 47.21
Group 248 -2.57 2.59 0.84 23.52 23.89
Open Asian LDCs
Hong Kong 50 1.29 2.86 0.34 11.67 11.74 24.40
Malaysia 48 3.49 2.80 0.77 11.22 11.76 22.26
Singapore 50 1.85 2.79 0.48 11.38 11.53 20.78
Group 148 2.19 1.62 0.91 11.35 11.60
Closed LDCs
Bahrain 49 7.11 1.57 1.00 633 9.58 17.18
Greece 50 0.55 6.20 0.07 25.31 25.32 45.95
Mexico 50 0.17 12.42 0.01 50.72 50.72 88.17
South Africa 50 4.63 12.47 0.28 50.89 51.11 99.29
Group 199 3.10 4.67 0.75 38.02 38.26
OtherEuropean DCs
Austria 49 -5.98 6.35 0.64 25.6526.36 42.21
Belgium 50-6.68 5.71 0.7523.30 24.31 44.90
Denmark 50 —6.57 5.86 0.72 23.93 24.83 40.66
France 50 -5.74 6.12 0.64 25.00 25.66 42.25
Ireland 48 —3.26 6.12 0.40 24.48 24.71 '+3.44
Italy 48 —6.30 5.86 0.70 23.4324.2841.43
Norway 50 -3.08 5.41 0.42 22.10 22.32 37.93
Spain 50 —3.39 5.65 0.44 23.07 23.32 38.87
Sweden 50 —4.57 4.55 0.67 18.56 19.13 33.19
Group 445 —5.09 1.90 1.00 23.14 23.74
Liberalizing Pacific DCs
Australia 49 4.98 8.90 0.42 35.98 36.33 70.91
Japan 49-10.62 6.36 0.88 25.70 27.85 52.99
New Zealand 50 —0.01 9.82 0.00 40.09 40.09 85.06
Group 148 -1.87 4.88 0.65 34.27 34.93
All Countries 1188 —1.88 1.35 0.92 26.79 27.23
*See Table 2a for notes.Table 6b: Real Exchange Depreciation (ex ante)
Predicted Exchange Depreciation Less Predicted Relative Inflation
Sept. 1982 —Oct.1986
Percent p.a.
All Countries —2.00 —1.14 0.94 —0.28 14.12
*Group standard deviations calculated with deviations around
**Djfferent from zero with 95Y.confidence.

































































































Bahrain 19.54 0.68 2.53 0.84 0.50
Greece 57.02 -6.30 13.43 1.07 0.60
Mexico 131.24 -1.37 28.16 1.72 0.78
South Africa 41.20 0.71 18.41 0.55 0.34


























































Group -15.82 -3.27 0.29 4.75 13.34
Liberalizing Pacific DCs















Group -0.44 —2.58 2.89 -1.82 14.67—22—
general to identify statistically significant elements of fd —
Mishkin(1984b, 1353—54) notes how, even though the real interest differ-
ential is highly significant statistically, the high variance of s makes
it difficult to separate out the exchange risk premium in a statistically
significant way. On the other hand, the existence of large uncertainty
regarding the future spot rate suggests, via the theory of optimal
portfolio diversification, that a non—zero exchange risk premium must
exist, to reward risk—averse investors for holding currencies that are
perceived as risky or that are in oversupply.23
lb estimate ex ante returns, in Table 5b we project fd —
ontothe forward discount, the interest differential, and the one—year
lagged inflation rate, the same variables as in the earlier regressions.
Monetary models of exchange rate determination give us reasons why any one
of these three variables, when considered alone, might be a useful predic-
tor of changes in the spot rate. The general principle of efficient
foreign exchange markets, jointly with the absence of an exchange risk pre-
mium, would imply that no predictable component of spot rate changes should
remain beyond the forward discount. &it many previous studies of bias in
the forward rate have found statistically significant results by condi-
tioning on the forward discount itself. The null hypothesis of unbiased—
ness is a zero coefficient on the forward discount, but most studies find a
coefficient closer to one, which would indicate that the spot rate follows
a random walk (the rationally expected rate of depreciation is zero), and
all of the forward discount is an exchange risk premium. Some studies even
get a coefficient greater than one.
The regressions appear statistically significant by an F test at the
95 percent level for 12 of the 24 countries (though it is usually not aTable 6c: Real Exchange Depreciation (ex ante)
Forecast Exchange Depreciation Less Forecast Relative Inflation
StiR on Groups using Non-Overlapping Data
Sept. 1982 —Oct.1986
Percent p.a.
*Group standard deviations calculated with deviations around each
+Used a separate intercept for each country.
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Canada 18 5.00 9.30 —1.13 4.22 0.99
Germany 18-40.53** 1.11 4.84 16.43 1.00
Netherlands 18—29.22**—8.69 4.01 16.97 1.00
Switzerland 18—35.78**—13.58 0.57 13.46 0.98
United Kingdom 1812.42 -63.68 —0.98 17.89 1.00
Group 90 4- 4.15 -0.97 14.68 1.00
Open Asian LDCs
Hong Kong 18-5.00 12.35 0.59 7.15 1.00
Malaysia 15—0.57 -3.69 -0.57 3.75 0.33
Singapore 18—10.05 —12.67 —1.07 4.84 0.61
Group 51 + -4.91 0.30 5.52 0.99
Closed LDCs
Bahrain 1618.72** 0.15 1.85 4.22 0.87
Greece 1848.90 -7.95 -0.03 15.86 0.68
Mexico 15104.84 1.50 32.93 0.91
South Africa 17 7.83 —10.45 3.06 15.96 0.36
Group 66 + 0.45 —0,40 19.62 0.08
Other European DCs
Austria 18-32.85**—8.66 ._0.95** 8.o8** 15.88 1.00
Belgium 18-10.04 —4.99 —0.69 4,55** 9.67 1.00
Denmark 18—30.B1** —0.72 5.94** 12.77 1.00
France 18-7.64 -10.66 1.40 4.52** 7.95 1.00
Ireland 18—6.93 13.23** 2.26** 60.62 1.00
Italy 18 7.16 0.75 1.86 6.80 0.98
Norway 18 17.06 —3.48 —2.57 0.09 10.93 0.99
Spain 18—33.86 -1.67 —0.37 6.78** 7.34 0.94
Sweden 1827.66** 6.82 -3.09 11.98 1.00
Group 162 + 0.32 1.63** 22.52 1.00
Liberalizing PacificDCs
Australia 1820.52 5.46 —5.78 —3.11 14.31 0.75 0.47
Japan 18-26.74 27.51 -34.88 8.18 12.31 1.52 0.78
New Zealand 18 3.41 —7.71 6.37**—1.36 24.89 2.86 0.95
Group 54 + -6.10 4.51 -2.51 18.04 2.74 0.94—23—
positive coefficient on the forward discount that gives the explanatory
power). This constitutes a rejection of the hypothesis of perfect
substitutability (no exchange risk premium), jointly with the rational
expectations assuniption.24 We proceed for the moment on the usual
assumption that the systematic prediction errors should be interpreted as
the exchange risk premium rather than as systematic expectationalerrors.
All the countries that are statistically significant are industrialized
countrIes, confIrming the importance of floating exchange rates for
exchange risk. In Table 5c we pool observations from the cross section of
currencies within each of the five country groups. We use Seemingly
Unrelated Regressions to take proper account of the correlation in the
error term across currencies. (When, for example, the dollar/Belgian franc
rate increases, the dollar/Danish kroner rate often increases at the same
time.) We can now reject the joint hypothesis for one additionalcurrency,
the Hong Kong dollar, and for all but one of the aggregatedcountry groups.
The standard deviation of the projected exchange risk premium is
reported in column (8). It is large, indeed much larger than the standard
deviation of the total real interest differential, whether the projections
are done country—by—country, in Table 5b, or simultaneously, in Table 5c.
In Table 6 we report the statistics for the other component of the
currency premium, expected real depreciation. Given the now widely—
accepted failure of purchasing power parity on levels, there is no theoret-
ical reason to expect it necessarily to hold in terms of expected rates of
change, a hypothesis sometimes known as ex ante relative purchasing power
parity. Nevertheless many previous studies have been unable to reject
statistically the hypothesis that the real exchange rate follows a random—24—
walk, which in turn implies, if expectations are rational, that expected
real depreciation is zero. Table 6a reports the statistics for uncon-
ditional real depreciation. The means in column (1) are negative,
indicating real appreciation of the currency against the dollar, for all of
the developed countries on the European continent, regardless of financial
openness, and for Japan and New Zealand. The LDcs, plus nada, the United
Kingdom and Australia, all depreciated in real teruis during our 1982—87
sample period. Nost are not statistically significant. &it the signs are
usually the same as the signs of the mean real interest differentials,
suggesting a high correlation of the real interest differential and ex-
pected real depreciation across countries. Columns (2)—(4) show very high
variability in real depreciation, but again this tells us little about the
variation of ex ante expected depreciation, beyond the observation that the
high level of variability implies low power in our tests of ex ante
relative purchasing power parity.
Table 6b reports the results from conditioning real depreciation on
our same three variables •Notethat if the nominal exchange rate follows a
random walk then the real exchange rate cannot follow a random walk, to the
extent that inflation differentials are forecastable. (Of course one can
fail statistically to reject both random walk hypotheses due to low power.
Indeed this sort of failure is very common.) The regressions appear
statistically significant at the 95 percent level in only 8 cases out of
24. The significant countries are all Industrialized countries that also
showed significant exchange risk premiums: Austria, Canada, Denmark,
Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
The specific regression results, if not the finding of some
significant countries, may be sensitive to the sample period. The standard—26—
believe that these figures represent the expectations that investors held?
An alternative approach is offered by survey data on the exchange
rate expectations of market participants. Three such surveys have been
conducted in the 1980s, by American Express, the Economist, and Money
Market Services, Inc. The data are analyzed in Frankel and Froot (1985,
1986) and Froot and Frankel (1986) •28 They show that respondents at
horizons of 6 and 12 months expect the dollar to regress to PPP (using the
1973—80 average real exchange rate as the base), to a highly significant
degree statistically. Table 7 reports results from the Economist data at
the six—month horizon. To obtain enough observations, the five exchange
rates against the dollar are pooled (mark, yen, pound, French franc and
Swiss franc) .Rows(1)—(4) show a highly significant expected nominal
depreciation in response to gaps from PPP, whether or not we correct for
first—order autoregression in the residuals. The expected speed of
regression is estimated at .061 to .165 per six—months, or 12—33 percent
per annum. This is roughly in the same range as the actual speed of
regression to PPP estimated on 116 years of real exchange rate data. Row
(5) shows expected real depreciation in response to PPP gaps that is also
significant statistically, (though the other Economist six—month data set
reported in row (6), from alternate non—overlapping survey dates, is not
significant). According to the survey data the expected real depreciation
of the dollar in the early 1980s was large enough to explain the entire
differential in real interest rates between the United States and its
trading partners. This conclusion is consistent with that of the preceding
sections, that the large and variable real interest differentials that are
still observed among the larger industrialized countries in the 1980s are—25—
deviation of the projected real depreciation (column (8) in table 6 b) is
large; as with the projected exchange risk premium, the variability is
greater than the variability in the real interest differential.
As noted, many previous studies have failed to reject a random—walk
real exchange rate.25 It has been suggested that this failure reflects the
low power of tests based on the short data set available from the floating
rate period (fifteen years of data) •26 Frankel (1986) uses 116 years of
U.S.—U.K. time series data, and finds a statistically significant tendency
of the real exchange rate to regress to purchasing power parity at a rate
of 15—30 percent a year. Table 6c musters more data to attack the problem
along another dimension, by pooling across countries. Pooling allows a
rejection of the null hypothesis in most cases. The significance levels
are highest for European countries and remain low for most of the LDCs,
suggesting that exchange rate variability makes expected real depreciation
an important contributor to real interest differentials for countries on
floating exchange rates in particular. This finding supports the claim of
McKinnon (1987) that the variability of real exchange rates under the
floating—rate regime leads to variability in real interest differentials.
} concludes that a more stable exchange rate regime would be more
efficient economically.
One possibility is that the entire approach of trying to infer
expectations from ex post exchange rate changes has been overdone. From
1981 to 1984 the rate of return on dollar assets was 12 to 18 percent
higher than on other major currencies, because the interest differential
favored the dollar and yet the dollar persistently appreciated rather than
depreciated. The difference was statistically significant.27 Do we really—27--
not in most cases due to imperfect integration of financial markets across
national boundaries.
8.Qrnclusions RegardingAlternative Measuresof (hpital Mobility
Measuresof capital mobility that are based on rates of return are
superior to saving—Investment correlations in that they require no assump-
tion about the exogeneity of national saving or of chosen instrumental
variables, nor about other parameters such as the sensitivity of investment
to the real interest rate. &t we saw in section 4 that the real interest
differential criterion gives some of the same counterintuitive results as
the saving—investment test: it appears to show that, even in the 1980s and
even among industrialized countries, capital mobility remains low.
We conclude the paper by seeing what role each of the components of
the real interest differential has in explaining the variance of the
total. Qiart 1 plots the standard deviation of the real interest differ-
ential against the standard deviation of the covered interest differential,
which we have identified as the political premium. While the political
premium does have some explanatory power, the fit is not extremely close
(R2 =.48)and would be even weaker if one were to exclude Mexico, where
political risk has increased drastically since August 1982 due to the
international debt crisis.
Chart 2 puts the real forward discount, which we have identified as
the currency premium, on the horizontal axis. Here the relationship is
stronger (a2= .76)•29 (The only country that is an outlier is South
Africa, another case where it is plausible that political factors should



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of integration, especially for Canada, Germany, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Sweden, Japan, Hong Kong and
Singapore. For these countries, currency factors, not political factors,
explain virtually the entire real interest differential. In this line, it
is highly suggestive that real interest differentials appear to have become
more variable after 1973 despite the reduction in political barriers. It
is possible that the increase in the saving—investment coefficient after
1973, evident in Table 1 and in earlier studies, is due to this increase in
real interest differential variability, which may in turn be due to the
change in exchange rate regime as McKinnon (1987) claims.
Even for most of the countries that show significant political
premiums, the currency factors dominate. Of the two currency factors,
expected real depreciation is as large and variable as the exchange risk
preuiiuni and appears to be the more important determinant of the real
interest differential. To this extent, imperfect integration of goods
markets, rather than imperfect integration of financial markets, may be
responsible for the failure of real interest rates to be equalized. &it
this is no reason to change the conclusion that a shortfall of national
saving can drive the real interest rate above foreign levels and thereby
crowd out investment in the same country.—28—
important determinant of the real interest differential than is the
political premium, even though it is the latter variable that measures
financial integration across national boundaries.
The remaining question is whether the explanatory power of the real
forward discount comes from the exchange risk premium or expected real
depreciation. Qiarts 3 and 4 show the measures based on variability of
these two (ex ante) differentials, respectively. The question of this
decomposition is harder to answer because of the unobservability of
exchange rate expectations. t the evidence seems to suggest that
expected real depreciation is somewhat more closely related to the real
forward discount, and in turn to the real interest differential, than is
the exchange risk premium. This is particularly true for the first moments
shown in tharts 7 and 8: there is, if anything, a negative relationship
between the mean exchange risk premium and the mean real interest
differential (both ex post) across countries. &it the standard deviations
also show a stronger fit for projected real depreciation (R2 =.35)than
for the projected exchange risk premium CR2 =.03).Our findings consti-
tute a rejection of the identification by Korajczyk (1985) of the exchange
risk premium with the real interest differential; this has also been
pointed out by thngworth (1986, p. 16), who reports findings on the
importance of expected real depreciation similar to ours.
To repeat our conclusions, the covered interest differential is a
better measure of capital mobility —inthe sense of the degree of
financial market integration across national boundaries ——notonly than
saving—investment correlations, but also than real interest differentials.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table  8:  Abbreviations  Used  On  Charts 
AtP  Australia 
AS  Austria 
BA  Bahrajn 
BE  Belgium 
CA  Canada 
DE  Denmark 
FR  France 
GY  Germany 
GR  Greece 
HK  Hong  Kong 
IR  Ireland 
IT  Italy 
JA  Japan 
MA  Malaysia 
MX  Mexico 
NE  Netherlands 
NZ  New  Zealand 
NO  Norway 
SI  Singapore 
SF  South  Africa 
SP  Spain 
SK  Sweden 
SW  Switzerland 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. Forward and Spot Exchange Rates
Spot and three month forward exchange rates for 23
countries are collected by Barclay's Bank and stored on DRIFACS
daily for the period September, 1982 to the present. Exchange
rates for the 24th country in our sample, Belgium, were also
stored on DRIFACS, but were compiled by the Bank of America. In
the cases of South Africa and Belgium which have dual exchange
rate systems, the forward and spot rates are for the financial
Rand and Franc. We used the last observation for each month
from September, 1982 through March, 1987, yielding a total
possible sample of 5 data points. Data were available for all
countries during the entire period except for Mexico; forward
rate data have not been reported for Mexico since March, l98.
All exchange rates are against the dollar.
The forward discount is calculated as four times the log
difference in contemporaneous forward and spot exchange ratts.
Exchange depreciation over the period is formed similarly,
substituting the realized spot rate three months later for the
forward rate.
2. Interest Rates
Interest rates were chosen to match as closely as possible
thethree—month term of the forward exchange rates and the
market—determined characteristics of the eurodollardepositrate
























































































































































































































































































































































































For this paper e use interest differentials, calculated as
ln(1+i) —ln(1+i*),where i refers to the local interest rate
and i to the eurodollar rate.
3. inflation Rates
All inflation rates are calculated from the consumer price
indices as published by the IMF in International Financial
Statistics. In all cases but four the indices are available
monthly; for Australia, Bahrain, Ireland and Ne Zealand
quarterly data were interpolated to form monthly series.
Inflation rate differentials (local vs. U.S. inflation) over the
life of the three month contracts are calculated as
L+Eln(1+u.) —ln(1+r.+.)J where ir.,and1T.+.,*referto local and
U.S. three month inflation rates, calculated with:
=ln(P.b.+.,) — ln(P,)
Theoneyear lagged inflation differential used in projecting
exchange and inflation rates are calculated in a similar manner:
1fl(1+T._-1r —ln(1-4-irinterest differential comes from exchange rates and interest
rates observed at the same instant. This is not possible for
such a large sample of countries, but for most of the countries
interest rates are observed on the same day, or very close to
it. A table of the rates, their sources and definitions appears
below. Thesourcesare: WFM ——WorldFinancial Markets,
published by Morgan Guaranty Bank, DRI ——DataResources'




























Interest rates are quoted on an annual basis and are mostly
available for all countries during the entire period. For the
case of Malaysia data begin in September, 1983, rather than
Interest Rate
3 Month Finance Co. Paper
3 Month Time Deposits
3 Month Time Deposits
3 Month CDs
3 Month Prime Finance Co. Paper
3 Month Time Deposits
3 Month Interbank Deposits
3 Month Interbank Deposits
3 Month Time Deposits
3 Month Interbank Deposits
3 Month Interbank Deposits
3 Month Interbank Deposits
3 Month Gensaki Rate
3 Month Interbank Deposits
3 Month Time Deposits to Businesses
3 Month Interbank Deposits
90 Day Commercial Bills
3 Month Time Deposits
3 Month Bank Acceptances
90 Day Bank Acceptances
3 Month CDs, Bank of Spain
6 Month Deposits
3 Month Interbank Deposits
3 Month Interbank Deposits
3 Month Eurodollar Deposits—31—
"We here depart from the usual practice of not reporting the
coefficients in the projection and thus sweeping under the rug the question
of their sensibility. The usual argument is that as long as the variables
are predetermined, the projection will be reliable asymptotically. Mishkin
(l984a,b), for example, projects the real interest rate on i, lagged money
growth, lagged inflation, time, time2, timeand time4. It is easy to
forget that instrumental variables will only give good answers if they are,
not only exogenous, but also correlated with the righthand—side variable.
'2The last 29 observations for Italy, and a few observations for
Austria, show forward rates that are very close to the contemporaneous spot
rates, giving forward discounts that are close to zero. While Barclay's
purports to trade at these rates, they seem suspect. The reader may want
to disregard the numbers for Italy and Austria in Table 3 (also Tables 4
and 5)
For example, Frankel and Froot (1986), Table 2a; Frenkel and
Levich (1975, 1977).
14For example, Otani (1983) and Frankel (1984).
15Clausen and Wyplosz (1982), Frankel (1982), and Giavazzi and
Pagano (1985, pp. 27—28), among others.
16Political risk premiums on long—term bonds are not limited to LDC
debtors.In 1980—82 the U.S. government had to pay a higher interest rate
on U.S. bonds than European governments had to pay on Eurobonds denominated
in dollars. The same U.S.—Euromarket differential held for corporate
bonds. Both differentials fell sharply in mid—1982, presumably as
investors reacted to the international debt crisis by fleeing to the safe
haven of the United States. Interestingly, the short—term differential
(U.S. interbank rate minus Eurodollar) behaved precisely the opposite: it
was negative until it fell sharply after August 1982, suggesting perhaps a
completion of the liberalization process (begun 10 years earlier) relevant
only in the money markets. (Frankel, 1987b, Figures 1 and 2).
17Thailand had a similar negative covered interest differential
during most of this period, according to a forward rate quoted by a Bangkok
bank; it went positive in April 1986. (Frankel, 1987a)
18Argy (l987,pp. 132—36).
'91t should be noted that the forward rate quoted by Barclay's
applies to the Saudi riyal. We match it up with the Bahraini interest rate
because no local interest rate is available for Saudi Arabia and the two
countries are said to be closely tied financially. The riyal is classified
by the IMF under the same exchange rate arrangement as Bahrain's currency,
the dinar, "Flexibility limited in terms of a single currency [the
dollar] ,"whichwould suggest that the same forward rate could be applied
to both. Bat the riyal exchange rate does in fact vary somewhat, so that
our measured covered interest differential is not entirely legitimate.—30—
Footnotes
'Alarge literature tests and rejects the unbiasedness of the
discount in the forward exchange market. Given covered interest parity,
this is equivalent to the tests of unbiasedness in the interest diffe-
rential. The forward market literature is comprehensively surveyed by
Hodrick (1987)
20bstfeld (1986b) in 1967—84 time series finds the highestsaving—
investment correlation for the United States, followed by Canada, Germany,
Japan, Italy and Austria, and then ——withless significant coefficients —
France,the United Kingdom, Mexico and Australia.
3Feldstein and Horioka used instrumental variables to correct for
endogeneity of saving. Defense expenditures and the retirement—age
proportion of the adult population are used as instrumental variables in
Frankel (1986, p. 41) for a U.S. time series context, and in Dooley,
Frankel and Mathieson (1986, p. 15) for a cross—section context. The two
papers also discuss the "big country" argument and other alleged econo-
metric problems. The finding of a high dependence of investment on saving
appears to be robust.
4Harberger (1983) and Murphy (1984) argue that one would expect a
priori capital mobility (by the Feldstein—Horioka definition) to appear
higher for small political units than for large ones. Dooley, Frankel and
Mathieson (1986, pp. 24—7) takes exception to their argument.
5Obstfeld (1986a) finds that the coefficient fell after 1973, in
time series correlations for most of his countries, but Obstfeld (1986b)
finds that it has risen over time (1967—84 vs. 1956—66)
6For example, Frenkel and Levich (1977, 1981).
7Frankel (1986) elaborates on this point. For similar treatments of
alternative criteria of capital mobility, see also Boothe, etal (1985),
and Obstfeld (1986)
8E.g., Lanyi and Saracoglu (1983, Table 1) and Khatkhate (1985,
Table 7). On the other hand, Blejer and Gil Diaz (1985) provides an
example of a country, Uruguay, that liberalized financial markets and, as a
consequence, had a real interest rate that followed the foreign rate very
closely, turning sharply positive in 1980. OurthreeEast Asian LDCs are
of this type.
9The standard errors for individual country means are usable, indeed
conservative, despite the use of overlapping observations, because they are
calculated as if there were T/3 observations rather than the actual T
observations used.
'°We classify Japan with Australia and New Zealand, rather than with
the large (G—i1) open industrialized countries, both because of geography
and because all three Pacific countries have only pursued financial market
liberalization in the 1980s.—33—
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